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involves "Those rare and extraordinary cases involving
sales for a contingent obligation in which the fair market
value of the obligation cannot be ascertained."32
Effect of election out of installment reporting
With the AMT problem limited to sales under the
installment method under I.R.C. § 453,33 the obvious
question is whether a taxpayer could elect out of the
installment method and avoid the AMT liability problem.
The consequences of electing out of installment
reporting for deferred payment or deferred pricing contracts
are uncertain.  Under temporary regulations,34 a question is
raised whether deferral is possible if the taxpayer elects out
of installment reporting.  Those regulations state —
"A taxpayer who elects not to report an
installment sale on the installment method must
recognize gain on the sale in accordance with the
taxpayer's method of accounting....Receipt of an
installment obligation shall be treated as a receipt of
property, in an amount equal to the fair market value
of the installment obligation...."35
The TAM of January 14, 1993,36 states that
"...it is the Service's position that a cash method
taxpayer that sells agricultural commodities pursuant
to a fixed price contract must include the fair market
value of the contract as measured by the value of the
property sold in gross income in the tax year of sale
when the installment method is unavailable to it
unless the sale involves a situation in those rare and
extraordinary cases involving sales for a contingent
obligation in which the fair market value of the
obligation cannot be ascertained."37
The IRS TAM does not specifically state that deferred
payment reporting is unavailable if a taxpayer elects out of
installment reporting but that conclusion seems fairly
obvious.  It is possible that the regulation may be invalid as
attempting to control the consequences of transactions that
have elected out of I.R.C. § 453.  An argument could also
be made that deferred payment reporting continues to be
available and does not require an election out of installment
reporting.
Quite clearly, the latest pronouncement does not answer
all of the questions on deferral of income from crop and
livestock sales.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE. The defendant kept
horses on a fenced pasture next to two residential
subdivisions developed by the defendant. The plaintiff, a
minor child, was kicked by a horse when the child climbed
through the fence and approached the horse. The plaintiff
argued the liability of the defendant based on the attractive
nuisance doctrine. The horse was not shown to have vicious
propensities. The court held that the attractive nuisance
doctrine did not apply to domestic animals when securely
maintained on a farm. The court noted that the pasture was
enclosed by a barbed wire fence, signs were posted to warn
trespassers and the defendant hired employees to chase
children off the premises.  North Hardin Developers v.
Corkran, 839 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
DISCHARGE. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
had sold a farm which the debtor represented as 480 acres,
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although the debtor believed the farm consisted of 522 acres.
The buyer later had the farm surveyed, discovered that the
farm was only 380 acres and sued for rescission or recovery
of the deficiency. The court in that case held that a material
mutual mistake occurred and awarded the deficiency. The
buyer argued that the deficiency amount was
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(A) as obtained by
a false representation. The court held that the debt was
dischargeable because the debtor did not intend to deceive
the buyer. The debtor also failed to list several items of
property and income on the bankruptcy schedules and
refused to provide explanations or other evidence to explain
the deficiencies. The court held that the debtor would be
denied discharge under Section 727(a)(4)(A) for making
false accounts of the debtor’s property. In re Wiethuchter,
147 B.R. 193 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY. Prior to the filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor’s employment was terminated and
the debtor elected to have funds in an ERISA qualified profit
sharing plan distributed to the debtor. The funds were paid
after the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The trust argued that
the plan funds became estate property because the debtor
had acquired control over the funds after the employment
was terminated and the debtor requested distribution of the
funds. The court held that the debtor’s interest in the plan
was not estate property. The court cited Patterson v.
Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 2242 (1992) (see 3 Agric. Law Dig. 115)
for the rule that a debtor’s control over an  ERISA qualified
plan does not determine the status of the plan as estate
property. The court held that because the debtor’s interest
was still subject to the ERISA anti-alienation rule as of the
date of the bankruptcy petition, the debtor’s interest was not
estate property. In re Dunham, 147 B.R. 13 (Bankr. E.D.
N.C. 1992).
Prior to the filing for bankruptcy, the debtor’s
employment was terminated and the debtor elected to leave
the funds in an ERISA qualified profit sharing plan, at least
temporarily. Under New York law, the debtor had the right
to roll the funds over to an IRA or other qualified retirement
plan.  The trustee argued that because the debtor was
entitled to withdraw the funds after termination of
employment, the funds were estate property. The court held
that because, at the time of the filing of the petition, the
debtor still had the right to transfer the funds to another
retirement plan which would be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate, the funds were not estate property. In re
Nudo, 147 B.R. 68 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992).
On the date of the petition, the debtor held a contingent
interest in a trust. The trust prohibited the beneficiary from
assigning or otherwise alienating the beneficiary’s interest in
the trust but allowed the beneficiary to direct payment of
any distribution to a third party. The trustee had the
discretion to apply distributions directly for the benefit of
the beneficiary or the beneficiary's family. The court held
that the trust was a spendthrift trust not included in the
debtor’s estate. In re Wax, 147 B.R. 205 (Bankr. D. S.D.
1992).
The debtor was a beneficiary and one of three co-trustees
of a spendthrift trust established by the debtor’s parents. The
trustees had the power to invade principal for a beneficiary
for emergency purposes. The debtor had requested such
emergency distributions of corpus twice but only one
request was granted. The other trustees were the debtor’s
brother and a bank. The court held that the debtor’s position
as trustee did not negate the spendthrift nature of the trust
and the debtor’s interest in the trust was not estate property.
In re Hersloff, 147 B.R. 262 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. Over several months in 1988, the
debtors made several purchases of household goods and
financed the purchases through the seller. After the first
purchase, each subsequent purchase agreement consolidated
and refinanced the existing debt for the previous purchases.
The seller retained a purchase money security interest in all
of the household goods. The debtors sought to avoid the lien
against the household goods as impairing their exemption
for the goods. The court held that the consolidation and
refinancing of the previous purchase agreements
transformed the security interests into nonpurchase money
security interests, except for the last purchase; therefore, the
lien was avoidable except as to the last purchased household
goods. In re Parish, 147 B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
AUTOMOBLIE. The debtors, husband and wife, filed a
joint petition in bankruptcy and each claimed the $1,500
exemption in an automobile for a total of $3,000. The court
held that Idaho Code § 11-605 allows joint debtors to each
claim a separate $1,500 exemption in the same automobile.
In re Jackson, 147 B.R. 49 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
RETIREMENT PLAN. The debtor argued that the
debtor’s interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan was not
subject to a federal tax lien because of the anti-alienation
clause required by ERISA. The court held that the pension
plan was subject to the tax lien under an exception provided
in Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2). In re Jacobs, 147 B.R.
106 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
    CHAPTER 12
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  During the
pendency of the debtor’s Chapter 12 case, a creditor sold
cattle feed to the debtor on credit. The creditor sought
payment, under Section 506(c), from the proceeds of the
cattle which were collateral for another creditor’s priority
secured claim because the feed helped to preserve the
creditor’s collateral. The court held that the creditor had no
standing to bring the action because Section 506(c) allowed
only the trustee to bring such an action. In addition, the
legislative history referred to only the trustee and debtor-in-
possession as having the power to bring such actions.  The
court noted that its decision was contrary to decisions in the
First, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals;
however, the court held that the basis for those decisions, the
fairness to the administrative claimant, did not apply to the
instant case because the feed supplier could have taken other
actions to protect the claim. In re Caldwell, 147 B.R. 119
(M.D. N.C. 1992).
  POST-PETITION INTEREST. An undersecured creditor
sought payment of interest on a claim from the date of the
petition. The debtor argued that interest was payable on the
claim only from the date of confirmation of the plan. The
court cited United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) for the rule that
undersecured creditors were not entitled to interest on their
claims during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.
20                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
Thus, the court held that under Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(i), the
debtor was required to pay interest only for the period after
the confirmation of the plan. In re Lewis, 147 B.R. 37
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
    CHAPTER 13   
PLAN. The debtor had granted a security interest in a
truck to the creditor. Because the truck was worth more than
the remaining loan amount, the creditor had a secured claim
in the bankruptcy case. The debtor’s plan provided for
payment of the loan balance over the life of the plan at 13
percent interest. The creditor wanted a higher interest rate
similar to the rate charged by similar creditors, consumer
finance agencies. The court held that because the secured
creditor was entitled to receive the present value of the claim
and the interest rate should be determined using the federal
treasury bond rate plus a risk factor, the 13 percent rate was
sufficient in that it exceeded that rate. In re Ivey, 147 B.R.
109 (M.D. N.C. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
ABANDONMENT. In the course of the partnership
debtor’s case, real property was abandoned to the debtor.
The IRS ruled that the abandonment was not a sale or
exchange causing recognition of gain or loss to the
bankruptcy estate. Ltr. Rul. 9245023, Aug. 7, 1992.
JURISDICTION. From 1978 through 1981, the debtor
borrowed money from a pension plan maintained by a
corporation wholly-owned by the debtor. The loans were not
repaid and no interest was paid. The debtor filed for
bankruptcy in 1985 and received a discharge in that year but
the loans were not included in the bankruptcy schedules. In
1990, the IRS audited the debtor for 1980 and 1981 and filed
an examination report proposing an assessment of unpaid
taxes resulting from treating the loans as prohibited
transactions. The debtor argued that no deficiency could
arise because the loans were discharged in the 1985
bankruptcy case. The IRS argued that the loans were
prohibited transactions subject to tax and penalties post-
petition, thus depriving the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction.
The court held that although the loans were discharged in
the bankruptcy case, the debtor could still be liable for taxes
and penalties if the loans were prohibited under the I.R.C.;
therefore, a post-petition federal tax question remained for
which resolution should be obtained through the
administrative process or the tax courts. In re Somma, 147
B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
NET OPERATING LOSSES.  In a case under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the court held that the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy net operating losses could not be used by the
bankruptcy estate in filing its federal income tax return. In
re Luster, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,009 (7th Cir.
1992), aff’g, 138 B.R. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'g, 134 B.R.
632 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
CORPORATIONS
DIRECTOR AUTHORITY. The plaintiff was a
shareholder in a family farm corporation. The plaintiff
brought a shareholder’s derivative action to void a mortgage
granted by the corporation to the defendant. The corporation
had borrowed money from the defendant which was, in turn,
loaned to the two directors who voted for the loan from the
defendant. The directors used the loan proceeds for personal
expenses and the defendant knew that the loan proceeds
would be used for the directors’ personal  expenses. The
third director was not present at the meeting at which the
corporation loan from the defendant was approved because
the director did not receive notice of the meeting. The court
held that the mortgage was void because the transaction was
not properly authorized since one of the directors did not
receive notice of the meeting. In addition, the court held that
an issue of fact remained as to whether the defendant
reasonably relied on the authorization for the loan where the
defendant knew that the loan proceeds would be used for the
directors’ personal expenses and the defendant failed to
investigate whether the corporate authorization was properly
obtained. Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services, 977 F.2d 511
(10th Cir. 1992), rev’g, 738 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1990).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CAULIFLOWER. The AMS has issued proposed
regulations amending the United States Standards for frozen
cauliflower. 58 Fed. Reg. 3816 (Jan. 11, 1993).
NATIONAL FORESTS.  The defendant owned three
ranches which had access only through a road passing
through national forest areas. The defendant’s predecessors
in interest had acquired the property after the national forest
areas were reserved as national forests. The Forest Service
sought to have the defendant make a new application for an
easement for the road. The new application would require,
under regulations issued under the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act of 1980, the defendant to comply
with federal environmental, traffic, safety and health laws;
to restrict residential development of the defendant’s land;
and to pay a fee for use of the easement. The defendant
argued that the 1980 Act did not apply because the easement
existed prior to enactment of the act. The court held that the
restrictions and fee were reasonable and did not infringe the
defendant’s property rights. U.S. v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232
(D. N.M. 1992).
PEANUTS. The CCC has issued proposed regulations
amending the rules for disaster transfer of peanuts for
pricing purposes from an additional loan pool to a quota
loan pool. The amendment would exclude any peanut
poundage quota transferred to a farm under the fall transfer
provision from the poundage quota available to that farm to
effect a transfer under the disaster transfer provision. 58
Fed. Reg. 3514 (Jan. 11, 1992).
RICE. The FGIS has issued proposed regulations
amending the United States Standards for rough rice, brown
rice for processing and milled rice by establishing a special
grade for aromatic rice and eliminating the requirement that
rough rice or brown rice for processing must contain more
than 25 percent of whole kernels in order to be classed as
long grain, medium grain, short grain, mixed rough rice or




ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The decedent’s will
exercised a general power of appointment over property
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received from a predeceased spouse. The property was
appointed to the decedent’s estate and administered through
the residuary estate. The estate elected to make estate tax
payments in installments and borrowed money to pay the
estate tax. During the payment of the installments, the estate
incurred administrative expenses for interest on the federal
estate tax due, interest on the loan and attorney’s fees. The
IRS ruled that the administrative expenses relating to the
general power of appointment property were deductible
from the taxable estate. Ltr. Rul. 9246005, July 27, 1992.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. Two trusts
were established prior to 1985, with each trust having the
transferors’ two great-grandchildren and their issue as
beneficiaries. The trustee partitioned the two trusts into four
trusts with each pair of the trusts having one great-
grandchild and issue as beneficiaries. An undivided one-half
interest in each of the original trusts properties would be
owned by each pair of the new trusts. The IRS ruled that the
new trusts would not be subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9253009, Sept. 29, 1992.
The decedent established several trusts for skip persons
in 1983. The estate filed a statement from the decedent’s
physician with the estate tax return stating that the decedent
was mentally incompetent from October 4, 1984 until the
decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that assuming the decedent
was mentally incompetent from October 1984 until death,
the trusts would not be subject to GSTT. The IRS refused to
rule that the decedent was incompetent from October 1984
to the date of death. Ltr. Rul. 9252013, Sept. 24, 1992.
GROSS ESTATE.  Three taxpayers were
nonbeneficiaries of eight trusts which were irrevocable
before 1979. The taxpayers, individually or in conjunction
with each other, had the power to remove the disinterested
trustees. Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325 held that trust
property was included in the grantor’s estate where the
grantor retained the right to remove any corporate trustee.
The IRS ruled that, under Rev. Rul. 81-51, 1981-1 C.B. 458,
because the trusts were irrevocable before October 28, 1979
(the effective date of Rev. Rul. 79-353), the power of the
taxpayers to remove the disinterested trustees did not cause
the trust property to be included in the taxpayers’ gross
estate. Ltr. Rul. 9253017, Sept. 30, 1992.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The surviving spouse filed
an election to take against the will of the decedent, receiving
a one-third share of the decedent’s personal estate plus a life
interest in one-third of the decedent’s real property. Under a
settlement with the estate, the surviving spouse received the
amount of the proceeds of the sale of the real property equal
to the value of the life interest in the property.  The IRS
ruled that because the surviving spouse had the right under
state probate law to require the sale of the real property, the
one-third share of the proceeds of the sale of the property
plus the value of the one-third interest in the decedent’s
personal property was eligible for the marital deduction.
Ltr. Rul. 9246002, Jan. 15, 1992.
The decedent and surviving spouse had entered into an
antenuptial agreement which allowed the surviving spouse
to receive a portion of the decedent’s estate equal to an
elective share under the state probate law. The decedent’s
will provided that the surviving spouse would receive that
amount in trust for life with the remainder to pass to a
charity. The surviving spouse disclaimed a portion of the
amount passing in trust and entered into an agreement with
the estate and the charity as to other estate property which
would pass to the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the
property passing to the trust for the spouse was eligible for
the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9253006, Sept. 25, 1992.
VALUATION. The decedent was a shareholder in a
corporation of which most of the stock was owned by the
decedent or the decedent’s family. The stock was subject to
a buy-sell agreement, restricting the sale of stock and setting
the price of stock sold under the agreement at the book
value. Although the court held that the buy-sell agreement
set a fixed and determinable price for the stock, the
valuation of the stock for estate tax purposes could not be
limited to the buy-sell agreement price because the
agreement was entered into for the purpose of limiting the
decedent’s gross estate. Est. of Lauder v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1992-736.
As part of a program to fund an ESOP, a corporation
offered to exchange an equal value of ESOP stock for
common stock and to purchase for cash the ESOP stock
received by the shareholders. The members of the
shareholder’s family owned a controlling interest in the
corporation and a child of the shareholder was employed by
the corporation and could participate in the ESOP. The IRS
ruled that all of the transfers were not subject to the
valuation rules of I.R.C. § 2701, but if the shareholder
retained any of the ESOP stock, the stock would be subject
to the valuation rules. Ltr. Rul. 9253018, Sept. 30, 1992.
The taxpayer was the sole lifetime beneficiary of a trust
established by a parent and administered by an independent
trustee. The taxpayer contributed marketable securities to
the trust in exchange for an annuity equal in value to the
contributed securities. The annuity was to be paid for trust
assets in the following order: (1) from the income from the
securities, (2) from the corpus of securities, (3) from other
trust income, and (4) from other trust corpus. The IRS ruled
that the taxpayer’s interest was a qualified annuity interest
for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702. The IRS also provided an
example calculation of the value of the gift to the remainder
holders resulting from the contribution of the securities in
exchange for the annuity. Ltr. Rul. 9253031, Oct. 2, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL LABOR. The taxpayer operated a
nursery and employed resident aliens admitted to the United
States under I-668A status, I-668 status or with green cards.
The aliens performed agricultural labor for the taxpayer. The
IRS ruled that all three types of employment status were not
eligible for the exemption from the FICA withholding
requirement for agricultural labor because each immigration
status allowed the worker to work at any type of
employment. The exemption requires that the alien be
admitted to the United States solely for agricultural
employment. In addition, the employees’ wages were also
subject to FUTA withholding. Ltr. Rul. 9252003, Sept. 14,
1992.
CASUALTY LOSSES. The IRS has issued a list of
areas declared by the President as eligible for federal
disaster assistance, thus allowing taxpayers in those areas
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who suffered losses from the disasters to elect to deduct
such losses in the taxable year following the taxable year of
the disaster. Rev. Rul. 92-111, I.R.B. 1992-52, 11.
DIVORCE TRANSFERS. Under a divorce decree, the
taxpayer was required to sell all stock in a corporation back
to the corporation such that the taxpayer’s ex-spouse would
own all of the corporation stock. The court held that the
stock transfer was made pursuant to a divorce decree and the
taxpayer was not required to recognize gain from the
transaction under I.R.C. 1041. Arnes v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,016 (9th Cir. 1992), aff’g, 91-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,207 ( W.D. Wash. 1991).
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer owned a corporation
which operated a cutting horse breeding, raising and training
operation. The taxpayer was denied deductions for expenses
relating to the operation inasmuch as the business was not
engaged in for profit because the taxpayer did not
investigate or plan the profit making potential of the
business, provided no training program for the horses and
kept inadequate records. Dunwoody v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1992-721.
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer was an anesthesiologist
who performed services in various hospitals but who
performed office functions in an office in the taxpayer’s
residence. The Tax Court and Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals had allowed the deduction for the home office,
holding that the office was essential to the taxpayer’s
business, the taxpayer spent a substantial amount of time in
the office, and the taxpayer had no other location to perform
the office tasks. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the
criteria used by the lower courts in favor of a comparative
analysis of the locations where the taxpayer performed the
various business functions. In the case of an
anesthesiologist, the court held that the principal business of
the taxpayer was performed at hospitals and not in the home
office; therefore, no deductions were available for housing
expenses associated with the home office. Commissioner v.
Soliman, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,014 (S. Ct.
1993), rev’g, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), aff’g, 94 T.C. 20
(1989).
The taxpayers were husband and wife and the wife used
the taxpayer’s home for giving piano lessons. The taxpayers
claimed a deduction for 50 percent of the home expenses for
the piano lesson business, although the area used for lessons
was used for personal purposes when lessons were not being
given. The court held that the taxpayers were entitled to a
deduction for only 13 percent of the home expenses. The
husband used the taxpayers’ car and van in a business in
which the wife was a partner and claimed more than 70
percent of the vehicles’ costs as a business deduction. The
business use of the vehicles was substantiated only by gas
purchase receipts. The court held that the deductions for the
costs of the vehicles, including investment tax credit, were
not allowed for lack of sufficient substantiation of business
use. Langer v. Comm’r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,008 (8th Cir. 1992), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1990-268.
LETTER RULINGS.  The IRS has issued its annual list
of procedures for issuance of rulings, determination letters,
information letters and closing agreements. Rev. Proc. 93-1,
I.R.B. 1993-1, 10.
The IRS has issued its annual list of procedures for
furnishing technical advice to District Directors and Chiefs,
Appeals Offices. Rev. Proc. 93-2, I.R.B. 1993-1, 50.
    The IRS has issued its annual list of tax issues for which
the IRS will not give advance rulings or determination
letters. Rev. Proc. 93-3, I.R.B. 1993-1, 71.
The IRS has issued procedures for furnishing technical
advice to Key District Directors and Chiefs, Appeals Offices
regarding issues in the employee plans area. Rev. Proc. 93-
5, I.R.B. 1993-1, 83
The IRS has issued procedures for issuing determination
letters on the qualified status of employee plans under
Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7). Rev. Proc. 93-
6, I.R.B. 1993-1, 114.
LOSSES. The taxpayer invested in cows and embryo
implants and claimed losses, business deductions and
investment tax credits relating to the purchasing and selling
of the implanted cows. The court denied the deductions and
credits because the investments lacked economic substance.
The prices paid for the cows and embryos exceeded the fair
market value of the properties and the taxpayer failed to
provide sufficient proof that the taxpayer ever acquired title
to the properties. In addition, the sellers retained control
over the cows and embryos and had all the risk of loss.
Boyer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-724.
MEDICAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer relocated the
taxpayer’s food supplements business to the taxpayer’s
home because of the taxpayer’s illness. The court held that
the deductible medical expenses did not include amounts
paid for home office and repair expenses. Culmo v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-9.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued rules
under which the amount of ordinary and necessary expenses
of local travel or transportation away from home that are
paid or incurred by an employee will be deemed
substantiated under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-1T when a
payor provides a mileage allowance under a reimbursement
or other expense allowance arrangement to pay for such
expenses. Rev. Proc. 92-104, I.R.B.1992-52, 24.
NET OPERATING LOSSES . The taxpayer had elected
to carry forward net operating losses. The court held that the
election was irrevocable as to regular net operating losses
and as to alternative minimum tax net operating losses for
alternative minimum tax purposes. Branum v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-8.
PARTNERSHIPS
DEFINITION. The IRS has issued a consolidated list of
all states’ limited partnership acts which correspond to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act for purposes of Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2. Rev. Rul. 93-2, I.R.B. 1993-2, 8.
The IRS has ruled that a company organized under the
Colorado Limited Liability Act, Colo. Stat. §§ 7-80-101 et
seq., is a partnership for purposes of the I.R.C. because the
organization lacks the corporate characteristics of continuity
of life and free transferability of interests. Rev. Rul. 93-6,
I.R.B. 1993-3.
The IRS has ruled that a company organized under the
Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, Va. Code §§ 13.1-
1000 et seq., is a partnership for purposes of the I.R.C.
because the organization lacks the corporate characteristics
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of continuity of life and free transferability of interests. Rev.
Rul. 93-5, I.R.B. 1993-3.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. A corporation was
a partner and issued $100x of indebtedness to the
partnership. The partnership purchased the corporation’s
interest in the partnership by transferring the indebtedness
back to the corporation. The corporation’s basis in the
partnership was $25x, the fair market value of the
indebtedness was $90x and the partnership's basis in the
debt was $100x. The IRS ruled that the partnership did not
recognize gain or loss from the transaction but could adjust
the basis of other partnership property if a valid Section 754
election was made. The corporation recognized $65x of
gain, equal to the fair market value of the indebtedness,
$90x, less its partnership basis, $25x. The corporation also
had $10x of discharge of indebtedness income for the
difference in the face value of the debt, $100, and the fair
market value of the debt, $90, when the obligation was
discharged by transferring the debt to the corporation. Rev.
Rul. 93-7, I.R.B. 1993-4.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in December
1992 the weighted average is 8.10 percent with the
permissible range of 7.29 to 8.91 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 93-5, I.R.B. 1993-1, 13.
The IRS has provided a simplified method for amending
retirement plans to comply with I.R.C. § 401(a)(31) which
requires plans to permit direct payments for a rollover of
distributions to other eligible retirement plans. Rev. Proc.
93-12, I.R.B. 1993-3.
The IRS has announced the 1993 cost-of-living
adjustments applicable to dollar limitations on benefits
under qualified defined benefit pension plans. The
maximum limitation for the annual benefit under I.R.C. §
415(b)(1)(A) for defined benefit plans is increased to
$115,641. The limitation for defined contribution plans
under I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) remains at $30,000. IR 93-2,
Jan. 15, 1993.
S  CORPORATIONS
BUILT-IN GAINS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations governing the recognition of built-in gains and
losses for S corporations which made an S corproation
election after December 31, 1986.
The proposed regulations provide that I.R.C. §§
1374(d)(3), (4) (gain recognized during recognition period is
presumed to be recognized built-in gain or loss) apply only
to gain and loss recognized from sales and exchanges. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-4(a).
An S corporation’s items of income or deduction
generally are treated as built-in gain or loss if the item
would have been taken into account before the recognition
period by a taxpayer using the accrual method. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1374-4(b).
The proposed regulations provide rules for recognized
built-in gain or loss for (1) positive and negative income
adjustments under I.R.C. § 481(a), (2) cancellation of
indebtedness income and bad debt deductions, (3) income
from sales or exchanges reported under the installment
method, and (5) the distributive share of partnership items.
Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1374-4(c) through (h).
The proposed regulations provide rules for determining
recognized built-in gain and loss when an S corporation
holds an interest in a partnership. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1374-4(h). 57 Fed. Reg. 57972 (Dec. 8, 1992).
STOCK ACQUISITION. An S corporation owned stock
in a C corporation and purchased all of the corporation's
stock. The S corporation then merged the C corporation into
the S corporation. The IRS ruled that because an S
corporation is treated, under I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2), as an
individual in its ownership of stock, the purchase of the
stock was not a qualified stock purchase under I.R.C. §
338(d)(3) and the liquidation of the C corporation was not a
Section 332 liquidation. Ltr. Rul. 9245004, July 28, 1992.
TRUSTS. The decedent’s will established a trust for a
daughter and son-in-law with at least semi-annual
distribution of net income and the remainder to pass to a
charitable organization. The trustee sought a judicial
reformation of the trust to provide for annual distributions
equal to 8.59 percent of the net fair market value of the trust
assets. The IRS ruled that although the original trust did not
qualify as a charitable unitrust, the trust was eligible to be
judicially reformed. The judicial reformation, however, was
not qualified because the difference between the actuarial
value of the reformable interest and the actuarial value of the
qualified interest exceeded 5 percent of the actuarial value
of the reformable interest. The IRS ruled that the trust would
be allowed to further reform the reformable interest to not
less than 9.15 percent and not more than 9.79 percent of the
annual net fair market value of the trust assets. Ltr. Rul.
9252017, Sept. 25, 1992.
WITHHOLDING TAXES . The IRS has announced
that in four instances involving the sale or declaration of
dividends of securities in 1992 in which actual payments
were made in 1993, the backup withholding rate is 20
percent and not 31 percent as required for 1993 transactions.
Ann. 93-1, I.R.B. 1993-3.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PERFECTION. The debtor operated an integrated
turkey raising and production business on the debtor’s farm.
The turkeys were raised, slaughtered and processed into
various products, including turkey weiners. The debtor had
granted the plaintiff a security interest in the turkey
processing equipment. The plaintiff filed the financing
statement with the Secretary of State’s office. The debtor
had previously granted a security interest in the same
equipment to another creditor but that creditor filed the
financing statement with the county recorder. The court held
that the turkey processing equipment was not “equipment
used in farming operations” and the other creditor’s security
interest was unperfected because not filed with the Secretary
of State. Nat’l City Bank v. Golden Acre Turkeys, Inc.,





PRIORITY. The debtors had granted the FmHA a
mortgage in 1977 and 1978, securing several notes. In
1982, the debtors granted a mortgage to an individual
creditor. In 1986, the debtors executed three notes which
were stamped as reamortizations of the 1977 and 1978
notes and which included unpaid interest owed on the
original notes. The interest rate on the new notes was
identical to the rate on the first notes. The creditor sought to
have the 1986 notes declared subordinate to the creditor’s
1982 security interest, arguing that the 1986 notes were
new  indebtedness or that the increase in principal and
interest payments prejudiced the creditor’s liens. The court
held that the 1986 notes were only reamortizations of the
original notes as stated on the notes. The court also held
that the creditor was not prejudiced by the 1986
reamortization because if the debtors had defaulted and the
FmHA had foreclosed on the liens at that time, the creditor
would have received nothing. In re Earl, 147 B.R. 60
(Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992).
SUBORDINATION. The debtors had granted a
mortgage on their farm to the Small Business
Administration (SBA) to secure a loan. The debtors also
sought a loan from the defendant PCA in order to purchase
irrigation equipment. The PCA required the debtors to
obtain a subordination of the SBA’s security interest in the
land to the PCA’s security interest “in an amount not to
exceed $85,000.” The SBA did not see the PCA mortgage
before granting the subordination but the PCA mortgage
was recorded prior to the issuance of the subordination
agreement. The PCA mortgage included future advances.
The SBA objected to enforcement of the subordination
agreement as to loans made by the PCA after the initial loan
and to increase of the subordination amount to include
attorney’s fees and costs. The court held that because the
PCA mortgage was recorded before the subordination
agreement was issued, the SBA was on notice that the PCA
mortgage covered future advances. The court also held that
the subordination amount could not exceed $85,000, even
for attorney’s fees and costs. U.S. v. South Atlantic Prod.
Credit Ass’n, 606 So.2d 691 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE . the plaintiff operated a bark
mulching operation on land in an agricultural district. The
operation was determined by the zoning board to violate the
zoning restrictions of the district because the operation was
not an agricultural use of the land. The zoning board also
denied the plaintiff’s application for a conditional use
permit for the same reasons. The administrative decisions
were based on evidence that the mulch was used by urban
landscapers and was not produced from trees grown on the
plaintiff’s land. The court upheld the zoning board’s
decision as based on substantial evidence. Lawson v.
Foster, 603 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Burdick v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir.
1992), aff'g, 96 T.C. 168 (1991) (charitable deduction) see
p 5 supra.
Griffin Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl. 183 (1992)
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